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“The presidential election process described by the original Constitution left it to
each state to decide its electoral vote. No case, no precedent, no original understand-
ing gave the Supreme Court the jurisdiction—the authority—to consider, much less
condemn, the process that the Florida courts were following to decide Florida’s
vote.”1
In the stiff competition for worst Supreme Court decision ever, two candi-
dates stand heads above the others for the simple reason that they precipitated
actual fighting wars in their times. By holding that slaves, as mere chattels,
could not sue in court and could never be American citizens,2 and further inval-
idating the Missouri Compromise, which had prohibited slavery in new territo-
ries, Dred Scott v. Sandford3 charted the course to secession and Civil War four
years later. By disenfranchising Florida voters and thereby appointing popular-
vote loser George W. Bush as President, Bush v. Gore4 set in motion events
which would lead to two wars,5 neither of which is successfully concluded over
a decade later,6 as well as an unregulated greed-fest on Wall Street that contin-
ues to unhinge our economic well-being.7 As Professor Laurence Tribe, one of
* Professor and Lee Distinguished Scholar, Boston College Law School.
1 Anthony Lewis, A Supreme Difference, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, June 10, 2010, available at
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/jun/10/supreme-difference/?page=2.
2 As “beings of inferior order,” blacks “had no rights which the white man was bound to
respect.” Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1856).
3 Id. at 393. The inexcusable judicial imprimatur on the American version of apartheid
dubbed “Jim Crow,” Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), relegated black Americans to
a half-century of legalized second-class citizenship and worse, but precipitated no shooting
war.
4 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
5 While it is certainly possible that a President Gore would have initiated war against the
Taliban in Afghanistan, it is unlikely in the extreme that he would have done so against Iraq,
which had no connection to the 9/11 attacks, the casus belli for the former invasion. Indeed
Gore was vocal in the opposition to the Iraq debacle from before its inception. See Al Gore,
Former Vice President, Iraq and the War on Terrorism, Prepared Remarks for the Common-
wealth Club of California (Sept. 23, 2002), available at http://www.gwu.edu/~action/2004/
gore/gore092302sp.html; John Mercurio, Gore Challenges Bush Iraqi Policy, CNN.COM
(Sept. 23, 2002), http://articles.cnn.com/2002-09-23/politics/gore.iraq_1_gore-challenges-
military-strike-military-action?_s=PM:ALLPOLITICS.
6 The war in Afghanistan proceeds at full pace; and the recent withdrawal of combat troops
has left Iraq in a highly precarious state. See Helene Cooper & Thom Shanker, U.S.
Embraces a Low-Key Response to Turmoil in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, December 25, 2011, at A1.
7 Remarkably, Linda Greenhouse, long-time Supreme Court correspondent for the New
York Times, now “describe[s] the decision not as a travesty or tragedy, but as a bad hair
day. . . . [I]t was just something that happened, a weird gust of wind that blew through the
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Vice President Gore’s lawyers, observed with understatement recently: “Some
wrongfully decided Supreme Court decisions can be belatedly righted. Bush v.
Gore cannot.”8
On election night 2000, the returns sent the weathervanes of political ana-
lysts spinning. At approximately 8 p.m., some TV networks declared Gore the
winner by virtue of taking Florida’s twenty-five electoral votes.9 Two hours
later, spurred by Republican-leaning FOX News,10 the networks returned the
state to the “undecided” column; and by early morning they had given the state,
and thus the Presidency, to Governor Bush.11 At one point in the flip-flops,
Gore called Bush to concede. Later that night he called to take back his
concession.
Although John F. Kennedy was elected in 1960 with a margin of only
112,827 votes, or 0.1 percent of the popular vote, Al Gore’s lead of five times
that number (.5 percent)12 was thrown into dispute by the Electoral College
results. Ground zero for the fierce post-election contest was Florida, where
George Bush’s brother Jeb sat as Governor, and his state campaign co-chair
Katherine Harris was conveniently positioned as Secretary of State, the official
vote counter. As the state-law mandated manual recounts in several counties
were diminishing Bush’s razor-thin lead (less than three hundred votes at one
point), the dispute ended up in the state courts, ultimately resulting in a Florida
Supreme Court decision (by a four-to-three majority) on December 8, 2000,
ordering completion of the on-going recounts.13 The Republican candidate filed
an emergency application for a stay, which the United States Supreme Court (to
court, as the divided justices responded on a visceral level to very different perceptions of
the situation and the court’s proper role.” Linda Greenhouse, Op-Ed, My Florida Recount
Memory: Talking Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2010, at WK10, available at http://query.ny
times.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0CE1DA123DF932A15752C1A9669D8B63.
8 Laurence H. Tribe, Op-Ed, My Florida Recount Memory: Moving Forward, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 21, 2010, at WK10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/21/opinion/21flor-
ida.html?pagewanted=all (emphasis added). In identifying Bush v. Gore as one of the worst
products ever to come off the Supreme Court assembly line, I am in very good company.
See, e.g., ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME INJUSTICE: HOW THE HIGH COURT HIJACKED
ELECTION 2000, at 174 (2001) (it “may be ranked as the single most corrupt decision in
Supreme Court history”); JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE
SUPREME COURT 141 (2007) (“The justices did almost everything wrong. They embarrassed
themselves and the Supreme Court.”); VINCENT BUGLIOSI, THE BETRAYAL OF AMERICA:
HOW THE SUPREME COURT UNDERMINED THE CONSTITUTION AND CHOSE OUR PRESIDENT
(2001) (the title says it all).
9 DOUGLAS KELLNER, GRAND THEFT 2000: MEDIA SPECTACLE AND A STOLEN ELECTION 21
(2001).
10 Id. at 23. George W. Bush’s cousin was (wouldn’t you have guessed it?) the Fox News
director. Id.
11 Id. at 22–23.
12 See Presidential General Election Results Comparison - National, DAVE LEIP‘S ATLAS
OF U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, http://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/compare.php?type=
national&year=2000&f=0&off=0&elect=0 (last visited Mar. 3, 2012).
13 Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1262 (Fla. 2000).
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the shock of many observers)14 both granted and treated as a petition for certio-
rari, which it also granted.15
The stay of the Florida court’s mandate, issued on Saturday, December 9,
was so extraordinary that Justice Scalia, acknowledging that “it is not custom-
ary for the Court to issue an opinion”16 in such situations, nonetheless felt the
need.17 In it he asserted what must be the most bizarre finding of irreparable
harm anywhere in the law books: “The counting of votes that are of questiona-
ble legality does in my view threaten irreparable harm to petitioner Bush, and
to the country, by casting a cloud upon what he claims to be the legitimacy of
his election.”18 The “cloud” over his “legitimacy” was, in reality, that Bush
may not have received enough actual votes to win! We usually call that losing
the election.
As Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer complained in their dissent from
the Court’s order, this blatant repudiation of Florida’s Supreme Court was a
marked departure for a Court that thrived on federalism and state’s rights rheto-
ric, and that “[o]n questions of state law, . . . [has] consistently respected the
opinions of the highest courts of the States.”19 Moreover,
[c]ounting every legally cast vote cannot constitute irreparable harm. On the other
hand, there is a danger that a stay may cause irreparable harm to respondents—and,
more importantly, the public at large—because of the risk that the entry of the stay
would be tantamount to a decision on the merits in favor of the applicants. Preventing
the recount from being completed will inevitably cast a cloud on the legitimacy of the
election.”20
But the worst was yet to come. The Court ordered that briefs be filed the
following day, Sunday, and oral argument be heard on Monday.21 Scalia was
not going to allow any time for this extraordinary intrusion into the political
process to percolate through the citizenry.
On Tuesday evening, December 12, the Court released an unsigned per
curiam decision (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy,
O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas).22 Its premise was that the manual recounts
ordered by the Florida Supreme Court lacked specific uniform standards for
discerning “the intent of the voter,” the benchmark set out in the controlling
Election Code adopted by the Legislature.23 Conveniently ignoring the fact that
the state circuit court (as explicitly authorized by the Legislature) had already
issued such guidance for applying the “voter intent” standard to the legendary
14 The career clerk summoned by Justice Anthony Kennedy to discuss the certiorari peti-
tion did not even bring his pen and legal pad with him because he was so convinced that the
petition would be denied. See TOOBIN, supra note 8, at 152.
15 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046 (2000).
16 Id.
17 “Scalia, who was itching to shut down the recount as soon as possible,” even tried to
convince his fellow justices to go on to summarily reverse the Florida Supreme Court, with-
out hearing any oral argument at all. TOOBIN, supra note 8, at 162.
18 Bush, 531 U.S. at 1046 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
19 Id. at 1047 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
20 Id. at 1047–48 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
21 Id. at 1046.
22 Bush, 531 U.S. at 100. Justices Stevens, Breyer, Souter, and Ginsberg all filed or joined
dissenting opinions.
23 Id. at 105–06 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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hanging and dimpled chads,24 the majority found a risk of “arbitrary and dispa-
rate treatment of the members of [the] electorate”25 and so identified an Equal
Protection Clause violation.
This was an argument the Bush lawyers threw in as an afterthought, devot-
ing only three pages of their forty-two-page brief to it.26 Moreover, it is a claim
that Bush and Cheney had no standing to pursue, as it was the voters of Florida
who were the real injured parties if indeed some ballots were not counted while
similarly-situated ones were.27 The one-person, one-vote precedents relied
upon by the Bush lawyers, starting with Reynolds v. Sims,28 were brought by
residents, taxpayers, and voters challenging the various reapportionment
schemes, not by the candidates. Moreover, Gore’s lawyers noted the cruel irony
of Bush’s “request that this Court intervene in a state electoral process to
ensure that votes are not counted,” which “turns [the voter dilution cases on
their] heads.”29
24 Brief of Respondent at 44a, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (No. 00-949), 2000 WL
35546401. Bush lawyer Theodore Olson was flummoxed when asked repeatedly to articulate
any more meaningful standards during oral argument. See Transcript of Oral Argument at
18–25, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (No. 00-949), 2000 WL 1804429. Not surpris-
ingly, he would simply give the sole responsibility for vote-counting to Secretary of State
(and Bush campaign co-chair) Katherine Harris. See id.
25 Bush, 531 U.S. at 105. The more obvious inequity, pressed by Gore’s counsel David
Boies at oral argument, was the use of different voting machinery from county to county, as
is typical around the states. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 24, at 72. Paper ballots
here, optical readers there—all with different rates of errors. The majority expressed no
concern about that matter, perhaps because it would have put all American elections in
doubt. Theodore Olson moved the focus during his rebuttal to the lack of uniformity, from
county to county, regarding the interpretation of punch card ballots. Id. at 74.
26 TOOBIN, supra note 8, at 160. Gore’s lawyers characterized Bush’s argument on this
point at the Florida Supreme Court as “one throwaway line.” Brief of Respondent, supra
note 24, at 35.
27 As the Florida Supreme Court recognized, “[t]he real parties in interest here . . . are the
voters. . . . The contestants have direct interests certainly, but the office they seek is one of
high public service and of utmost importance to the people, thus subordinating their interests
to that of the people.” Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1254 (2000). No Florida voter made
such a claim in the litigation. Bush, as Vincent Bugliosi put it, “leaped in and tried to profit
from a hypothetical wrong inflicted on someone else.” BUGLIOSI, supra note 8, at 42; see
also Roberts v. Wamser, 883 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1989) (unsuccessful black candidate did not
have standing to challenge as discriminatory election results from manual recounts under
Voting Rights Act).
If disappointed candidates for state office were allowed to use the Voting Rights Act to challenge
the outcome of elections, federal courts would adjudicate every state election dispute, and the
elaborate state election contest procedures, designed to assure speedy and orderly disposition of
the multitudinous questions that may arise in the electoral process, would be superseded.
Wamser, 883 F.2d at 623. Amazingly, the Gore lawyers failed to raise the standing issue in
either their brief or oral argument. As a matter of justifiability, it should have been raised by
the Court in any event. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 61 (5th ed. 2007).
For a harsh, but justified, critique of the Gore legal team on the standing and equal protection
points, see BUGLIOSI, supra note 8, at 68–73. For a compelling treatment of the obvious
standing, ripeness, and political question doctrine barriers ignored by the Court, see Erwin
Chemerinsky, Bush v. Gore Was Not Justiciable, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1093 (2001).
28 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
29 Brief of Respondent, supra note 24, at 2 (emphasis omitted).
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The Rehnquist Court, which Erwin Chemerinsky observed had only
invoked the equal protection clause to strike down affirmative action programs
benefitting minorities and women,30 was now cynically employing it to disen-
franchise voters, many of whom were black.
But even if there were arguably a constitutional violation, protocol and
precedent would require remanding to the Florida courts for consideration of
appropriate standards under state law. Instead, while the Per Curiam ends cyni-
cally by stating “the Supreme Court of Florida is reversed, and the case is
remanded,”31 it concludes three paragraphs before that the deadline for com-
pleting the election had already arrived.32 The majority chose, in other words,
to appoint George W. Bush President right then and there, making him the only
candidate to ever achieve that lofty position by a one-vote margin.
The Court’s draconian remedy for what it alone perceived as a constitu-
tional violation was, in short, to simply disenfranchise the victims. On this
logic, the solution for the de jure segregation of public schools condemned in
Brown v. Board of Education would have been to expel the black students.
Having found unconstitutional the lack of uniformity in voting practices from
one Florida county to another, the majority imposed those very results on the
electorate, rather than allow the more accurate recount to continue. The trans-
parent hypocrisy was mind-blowing.
Recognizing that insistence on uniform vote-tallying rules would invali-
date results nationwide (where voting practices vary widely) in virtually every
election, the majority hastened to add that “[o]ur consideration is limited to the
present circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes
generally presents many complexities.”33 This was a one-day return train
ticket—good only today.34 Like the rest of Bush v. Gore, there is no precedent
for a decision of the Supreme Court that comes with the warning label “NOT
TO BE USED AS A PRECEDENT.”
Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas filed a concurring opinion invoking Article
II, Section 1, Clause 2, and Title 3 U.S.C. § 5, both of which explicitly confer
upon states the choice of presidential electors, but provide that it is the state
legislature that should direct the manner in which they are selected.35 The Flor-
ida Supreme Court, the three justices contended, had interfered in the Legisla-
ture’s rightful process. (That Court was dominated by Democrats, while the
Legislature was firmly in the hands of Republicans). The three thus insisted
that their decision “does not imply a disrespect for state courts but rather a
respect for the constitutionally prescribed role of state legislatures.”36 The
30 Quoted in BUGLIOSI, supra note 8, at 45.
31 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000).
32 Id. at 110.
33 Id. at 109.
34 See Adam Cohen, Editorial Observer, Has Bush v. Gore Become the Case That Must Not
Be Named?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2006, at A18. A Westlaw search reveals no Supreme
Court citation to the case since it was handed down. Lower courts have not all followed the
admonition. See, e.g., Black v. McGuffage, 209 F. Supp. 2d 889 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (relying on
Bush v. Gore to find an equal protection violation in the use of different systems of vote
counting, which resulted in dilution of African American and Hispanic votes).
35 Bush, 531 U.S. at 111–22.
36 Id. at 115 (emphasis omitted).
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Court’s ultra-conservatives, who never hesitated to defer to the state courts
when it served their ideological agenda, found that position inconvenient in this
controversy.
Reportedly, the five justices in the majority viewed the Florida Supreme
Court’s decision ordering the recount to continue as the work of Democratic
hacks seeking to throw the election to Gore.37 This was, ironically, just how
they themselves would be viewed after the highly dubious ruling in favor of
Bush—as Republican operatives loyally serving their Party’s interests. A full-
page advertisement in the New York Times on January 13, 2001, signed by 554
law professors, protested that “[b]y stopping the vote count in Florida, the U.S.
Supreme Court used its power to act as political partisans, not judges of a court
of law.”38 As Vincent Bugliosi persuasively argues, while the Supreme Court
had historically delivered some clearly ideologically-motivated decisions (lib-
eral or conservative), Bush v. Gore is unique in its crassly political (Republican
vs. Democrat) agenda.39
Notwithstanding the majority’s undisguised disrespect for the Florida
Supreme Court, the decision that court issued on December 840 is quite
thoughtful and modulated. It actually splits the difference between the positions
of the parties by ordering both continuation of the manual recount in Miami-
Dade County, sought by Gore, and statewide recounting of undervotes in all
counties, sought by Bush.41 In short, the Florida opinion reflects a balance that
completely eluded the five Bush boosters in Washington.
Dissenters Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Souter noted the breathtaking
upending of the majority’s usual deference to state court interpretations of state
law, even when federal rights are at stake,42 as well as the cruel irony of using
the Equal Protection Clause to disenfranchise the very victims of the perceived
violation.43 And in their view, since the Florida Constitution explicitly sub-
jected all legislative power to judicial review, the Florida Supreme Court had
not exceeded its lawful powers in resolving the electoral dispute.44
37 See TOOBIN, supra note 8, at 166 (supporting that at least one justice in the majority,
Justice O’Conner, held this view).
38 Law Professors for the Rule of Law, 554 Law Professors Say: By Stopping the Vote
Count in Florida, The U.S. Supreme Court Used Its Power To Act as Political Partisans, not
Judges of a Court of Law, N.Y. Times, Jan 13, 2001, at A7 (advertisement).
39 BUGLIOSI, supra note 8, at 75–76.
40 Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2000).
41 Id. at 1262.
42 See Bush, 531 U.S. at 135–43 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). But see Henry Paul Monaghan,
Supreme Court Review of State-Court Determinations of State Law in Constitutional Cases,
103 COLUM. L. REV. 1919 (2003) (arguing that Supreme Court reexamination of state law in
such cases is both familiar and proper).
43 Souter and Breyer conceded there might be equal protection issues in the disparate stan-
dards for vote-counting, but would have left it to the Florida courts on remand to articulate
uniform standards. Thus the spin by Bush supporters that the decision was 7–2 was just that,
pure spin. Ginsburg, who as an advocate before the Court had pioneered the application of
equal protection doctrine to women, was reportedly “galled” by the majority’s cynical use of
the clause to confer the presidency on a privileged white male legacy. TOOBIN, supra note 8,
at 173.
44 Bush, 531 U.S. at 145–46.
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And so the ballot-counting was stopped permanently, with George Bush
conveniently in the lead by just a few hundred votes. When the majority
invoked the December 12 “safe harbor” deadline (envisioned by 3 U.S.C. § 5)
as the reason a remand was not possible, it disingenuously failed to note that it
was the Court’s own stay days before that made compliance impossible; or that
the “safe harbor” deadline merely protects the state’s electors from being chal-
lenged in Congress, and that the only real deadline that mattered was the day
the electors would meet together and vote, which was December 18 and still six
days off. Nothing, in short, prevented the Court, as Justice Stevens chided,
from remanding to the state courts for a remedy that would not deprive Florida
voters of their franchise.45 But, as noted above, he had accurately predicted this
foreordained rush-to-judgment only days before. As Professor Tribe bemoaned,
“having itself run out the clock, [the Court] sadly had no choice but to end all
the counting that very night (Catch-22!).”46
Later in the evening of December 12, Al Gore conceded, again, but this
time for real.
John Paul Stevens concluded his dissent with his now-famous admonition:
“Although we may never know with complete certainty the identity of the win-
ner of this year’s presidential election, the identity of the loser is perfectly
clear. It is the Nation’s confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of the
rule of law.”47
His concern was sadly underscored by what we soon discovered about the
direct self-interest that at least three in the majority had in the outcome.
Antonin Scalia’s son, Eugene, was a partner in the Washington office of Gib-
son, Dunn & Crutcher in December 2000, the very firm in which Theodore B.
Olson, who argued George W. Bush’s case before the Court, was also a part-
ner.48 Only months later, the Bush administration selected Eugene Scalia for
the top legal position in the Department of Labor.49 At the time the Court was
hearing and deciding Bush v. Gore, Clarence Thomas’s wife Virginia was
working for the conservative Heritage Foundation, gathering resumes for
appointments in an anticipated Bush administration.50 The calls for Thomas to
45 Id. at 127 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
46 Tribe, supra note 8. Even Bush v. Gore defender Charles Fried, Harvard Law School
professor and former Solicitor General for Ronald Reagan, admitted this use of the deadline
as an excuse not to remand was “the least convincing portion of the Court’s opinion.”
Charles Fried, Letter to the Editors, ‘A Badly Flawed Election’: An Exchange, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS, Feb. 22, 2001, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2001/feb/22/
a-badly-flawed-election-an-exchange/?pagination=false&printpage=true.
47 Bush, 531 U.S. at 128–29. Professor Jesse H. Choper expanded on this concern in his
Why the Supreme Court Should Not Have Decided the Presidential Election of 2000, 18
CONST. COMMENT. 335 (2001).
48 Christopher Marquis, Contesting the Vote: Challenging a Justice; Job of Thomas’s Wife
Raises Conflict-of-Interest Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2000, at A26, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2000/12/12/us/contesting-vote-challenging-justice-job-thomas-s-wife-
raises-conflict-interest.html.
49 Linda Greenhouse, National Briefing — Washington: Scalia’s Son Named to Bush
Administration Post, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2001, at A22, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2001/05/08/us/national-briefing-washington-scalia-s-son-named-to-bush-administra-
tion-post.html.
50 Marquis, supra note 48.
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recuse himself, as 28 USC § 455 requires of judges if a spouse has “an interest
that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding,” were to
no avail. Lastly, Sandra Day O’Connor had been observed as visibly upset at an
election-night party when Florida was first called for Gore, remarking “[t]his is
terrible.”51 Her husband explained to the surprised guests that the couple
intended to retire to Arizona, and a Gore victory would mean she would have to
stay on the Court another four years to avoid a Democratic pick for her
replacement.52
The actual results of the 2000 presidential election remain in dispute. A
Media Consortium review of Florida’s uncounted ballots in 2001 concluded
that Bush would have won by a slender margin even if the Supreme Court had
not intervened, but that a full statewide recount of rejected ballots would proba-
bly have gone Gore’s way.53 With black precincts experiencing more than three
times as many rejected ballots as white precincts, early concerns about vote
suppression were confirmed.54 And there were, of course, the infamous “butter-
fly ballots,” which assuredly confused thousands of elderly voters who
intended to vote for Gore, but mistakenly punched Pat Buchanan. The New
York Times lamented: “The reality, therefore, is that Mr. Bush’s victory in the
most fouled-up, disputed and wrenching presidential election in American his-
tory was so breathtakingly narrow that there is no way of knowing with abso-
lute precision who got the most votes.”55
We will also never know whether the Republican partisans on the Court
would have made the same decision if it had been George W. Bush, and not Al
Gore, who needed the Florida recount to become President. But we can cer-
tainly make an educated guess.
51 Evan Thomas & Michael Isikoff, The Truth Behind the Pillars, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 25,
2000, at 46 (internal quotation marks omitted); TOOBIN, supra note 8, at 143.
52 Isikoff & Thomas, supra note 51, at 46; TOOBIN, supra note 8, at 143–44.
53 Ford Fessenden & John M. Broder, Examining the Vote: The Overview; Study of Dis-
puted Florida Ballots Finds Justices Did Not Cast the Deciding Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12,
2001, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/12/us/examining-vote-overview-
study-disputed-florida-ballots-finds-justices-did-not.html?pagewanted=print.
54 Ford Fessenden, Examining the Vote: The Patterns; Ballots Cast By Blacks and Older
Voters Were Tossed in Far Greater Numbers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2001, at A17, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/12/us/examining-vote-patterns-ballots-cast-blacks-
older-voters-were-tossed-far-greater.html?pagewanted=print.
55 Richard L. Berke, Examining the Vote: News Analysis; Who Won Florida? The Answer
Emerges, But Surely Not the Final Word, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2001, at A16, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/12/us/examining-vote-analysis-who-won-florida-answer-
emerges-but-surely-not-final-word.html?pagewanted=print.
